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BLD-248        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2425 
___________ 
 
DEWI DORIS DWIYANTI, 
 
                Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       
     Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A078-495-748) 
Immigration Judge: Donald V. Ferlise 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Alternative 
Motion for Summary Denial 
August 2, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 20, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 2 
 
 Dewi Doris Dwiyanti filed a pro se petition for review from the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying her motion to “reopen and reconsider.”  
The government has moved to dismiss her petition for lack of jurisdiction or, in the 
alternative, for summary denial.  We will grant the government’s motion and dismiss in 
part and otherwise summarily deny the petition for review.  
 Dwiyanti, a native and citizen of Indonesia, entered the United States in October 
2000 as a nonimmigrant visitor.  One week later she was served a notice to appear 
alleging that she had not complied with the conditions of the status under which she was 
admitted, to wit, she obtained employment without authorization.  Dwiyanti applied for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  The 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found that she was removable as charged, rejected her claims 
for relief, and ordered her removal to Indonesia.  Dwiyanti’s appeal to the BIA was 
dismissed in January 2003, and she did not petition this Court for review.   
 Approximately one month after her appeal was dismissed, Dwiyanti filed a motion 
for reconsideration or reopening with the BIA.  The BIA denied the motion in August 
2003 because it raised no new legal arguments or any other ground upon which to 
reconsider the earlier dismissal of her appeal.  The BIA also determined that reopening 
proceedings would be inappropriate as there was no evidence of changed country 
conditions in Indonesia.  Dwiyanti filed a second motion for reconsideration or reopening 
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with the BIA in December 2003, and it was denied in February 2004 as barred under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). 
 Over seven years later, in November 2011, Dwiyanti filed what she styled as a 
“Motion [to] Reopen And Reconsider An Emergency To Stay; Motion Of Ineffective 
Assistant [sic] Counsel.”  Because she challenged the IJ’s denials of her applications for 
relief, the BIA construed the pleading as a motion to reconsider.
1
  So construed, the BIA 
denied the motion as untimely and number barred in April 2012.  Dwiyanti then filed a 
petition for review with this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Dwiyanti’s third motion for 
reconsideration.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Her petition for review was filed in May 
2012—within thirty days of the BIA’s denial of her motion for reconsideration, but more 
than seven years after any of the BIA’s prior orders and decisions.  Accordingly, the 
petition for review is timely only as to the BIA’s April 2012 order.  See 8 U.S.C. 
                                              
1
 The BIA determined that although Dwiyanti sought further consideration of her 
applications for relief, her motion could not be construed as a motion to reopen because 
she did not offer new evidence.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen 
proceedings shall state the new facts . . . .”).  Dwiyanti has not challenged that 
determination.  Regardless, motions to reopen generally must be filed no later than ninety 
days after the date of the final administrative decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  Although the time restriction is subject to equitable tolling for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Dwiyanti—who noted the ineffectiveness issue seven 
years after the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s decision but provided no substantive 
argument regarding her counsel’s performance—did not exercise the diligence necessary 
for tolling to apply. See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Accordingly, the motion would have been untimely even if construed as a motion to 
reopen. 
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§ 1252(b)(1) (thirty days to file a petition for review).  Inasmuch as Dwiyanti challenges 
the BIA’s prior orders, we will dismiss the petition for review as untimely and beyond 
our jurisdiction.  See McAllister v. Att’y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011) (“This 30-day filing requirement is 
jurisdictional and is not subject to equitable tolling.”) (quotation marks omitted).  
 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion 
and will not disturb the BIA’s decision unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  
Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).  The BIA denied Diwyanti’s 
motion for reconsideration on the basis that it was filed after the thirty-day deadline for 
such a motion had expired. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).  In 
her petition for review, which Dwiyanti has prepared in the form of an appellate brief, 
she does not argue that the BIA erred in regarding her motion as time-barred.  Indeed, she 
offers no argument regarding the BIA’s decision whatsoever and instead attacks the 
decade-old order of removal.  As mentioned, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the 
removal order.  Furthermore, in light of the undisputed evidence of record that 
Diwyanti’s motion for reconsideration was filed after the statutory thirty-day deadline, 
the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion. 
 For these reasons, we will grant the government’s motion to dismiss the petition 
for review to the extent it challenges any action of the BIA save its 2012 Order denying 
the most recent motion to reconsider.  To the extent the petition for review is within our 
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jurisdiction, it presents no substantial question; we will therefore grant the government’s 
motion to summarily deny the petition for review.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; 
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002).  Dwiyanti’s motion for a 
stay of removal and request for a mediator are denied. 
